Indo-US Nuclear Deal and History

Origin of India’s Nuclear Weapons Program

India’s indigenous efforts in nuclear science and technology were established remarkably early. The first step was taken by Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha in March 1944 when he submitted a proposal to the Sir Dorab Tata Trust (established in honor of Bhabha’s own uncle, Sir Dorab Tata) to found a nuclear research institute, over three years before independence and a year before the first nuclear weapon test. This led to the creation of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) on 19 December 1945 with Bhabha as its first Director. The new government of India passed the Atomic Energy Act, on 15 April 1948, leading to the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) not quite one year after independence. At that time Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru declared:

“We must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war – indeed I think we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes. … Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way.”

In 1954 the Indian nuclear program began to move in a direction that would eventually lead to establishment of nuclear weapons capability. On 3 January 1954 the IAEC decided to set up a new facility – the Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay (AEET), later to become the “Indian Los Alamos”. On 3 August 1954 the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was created with Dr. Bhabha as Secretary. This department answered directly to the Prime Minister and has continued to do so down to the present day.

The program grew swiftly. The atomic energy budget increased 12-fold from 1954 to 1956. By 1958 the DAE consumed one third of India’s research budget. By 1959 AEET employed over one thousand scientists and engineers.

In 1955 construction began on India’s first reactor, the 1 MW Apsara research reactor, with British assistance. And in September 1955, after more than a year of negotiation, Canada agreed to supply India with a powerful research reactor – the 40 MW Canada-India Reactor (CIR). Under the Eisenhower Administration’s “Atoms for Peace” program the US agreed to supply 21 tons of heavy water for this reactor in Februrary 1956, and the reactor was dubbed the Canada-India Reactor, U.S. or CIRUS (now commonly written as Cirus).

The acquisition of Cirus was a watershed event in nuclear proliferation. Although the sale was made with the understanding that the reactor would only be used for peaceful purposes (the heavy water contract at least made this explicit), it occurred before any international policies were in place to regulate such technology transfers and no provision for inspections were made. And in fact India was careful to ensure that no effective regulation would accompany the reactor. India refusing to accept fuel from Canada for the reactor and set up a program to manufacture the natural uranium fuel for Cirus indigeneously so as to keep complete control of the plutonium produced there.

The reactor was a design ideal for producing weapons-grade plutonium, and was also extraordinarily large for research purposes, being capable of manufacturing enough plutonium for one to two bombs a year. The acquisition of Cirus was specifically intended by India to provide herself with a weapons option and this reactor produced the plutonium used in India’s first nuclear test in 1974; provided the design prototype for India’s more powerful Dhruva plutonium production “research” reactor; and is directly responsible for producing nearly half of the weapons grade plutonium currently believed to be in India’s stockpile. The sale further set a precedent for similar technology transfers which greatly assisted Israel in obtaining its own plutonium production reactor from France shortly thereafter.

The Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay was formally inaugurated by PM Nehru on 20 January 1957. It acquired its present name — Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) — on 12 January 1967 when PM Indira Gandhi renamed it in memory of Dr. Bhabha who died in an airplane crash on 24 January 1966.

Apsara, fueled by enriched uranium from the UK, went critical on 4 August 1957, becoming the first operating reactor in Asia outside of the Soviet Union (though only days ahead of Japan’s first reactor). Cirus achieved criticality at BARC on 10 July 1960.

Due to its vast domestic resources of thorium (a potential fuel for breeder reactors) but limited supplies of uranium, from the start of its nuclear program India has always placed strong emphasis on the development of breeder reactor fuel cycles. Breeder reactors require highly concentrated fissionable material for reactor fuel: either highly enriched uranium or plutonium. This provided a peaceful rationale for developing a plutonium separation capability, but the principal impetus for the India’s first fuel reprocessing plant was to obtain a nuclear option.

In July 1958 PM Nehru authorized project Phoenix to build a plant with a capacity of 20 tonnes of fuel a year – sized to match the production capacity of Cirus. The plant was based on the U.S. developed Purex process and an American firm, Vitro International prepared the plans for it. Construction of the plutonium plant began at Trombay on 27 March 1961 and was commissioned in mid-1964.

India’s civilian nuclear program was also established during this period. Discussions with American firms to construct India’s first nuclear power plants at Tarapur were held in 1960-61. An interesting incident sheds light on Nehru’s amd Bhabha’s thinking at that time. In 1960 Kenneth Nichols, a former U.S. Army engineer who played significant roles in the Manhattan Project, represented Westinghouse in discussions on power plant construction. In a meeting with Nehru and Bhabha, Nichols relates that Nehru turned to Bhabha and asked:

“Can you develop an atomic bomb?” Bhabha assured him that he could and in reply to Nehru’s next question about time, he estimated that he would need about a year to do it. … He concluded by saying to Bhabha “Well, don’t do it until I tell you to.”

On to Weapons Development

With the two projects necessary to provide the materials for nuclear weapons underway, the Cirus production reactor and the Trombay plutonium plant, Dr. Bhabha then turned his attention to acquiring information about nuclear weapons and initiating preliminary studies of weapon physics. n January 1962 Bhabha set up a formal study group in high pressure physics at TIFR, headed by Prof. A.K. Asundi, to explore equations of state in the megabar range, a necessary step for designing implosion weapons. This group did its work in secret, submitting its papers to Bhabha for review. In September 1962, at Bhabha’s urging, Nehru passed the revised Atomic Energy Act giving the central government strict control over all decisions on atomic energy and futher tightening secrecy (this act can perhaps be likened to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954). This act explicitly linked atomic energy and its control to national security, scarcely mentioning civilian applications.

Nehru died on 27 May 1964 and was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri who took office on 2 June. That summer and fall expectations of a Chinese nuclear test steadily increased. PM Shastri, a Gandhian, was strongly opposed to pursuing the Indian nuclear option, and Bhabha began making public statements in favor intended to increase public support and political pressure. In April Shastri gave Bhabha formal approval to move ahead with nuclear explosive development. On 5 April 1965 Bhabha initiated the effort by setting up the nuclear explosive design group Study of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP). Bhabha selected Raja Ramanna – Director of Physics at AEET – to lead the effort. This initial effort to develop a “peaceful nuclear explosive” (PNE) existed almost entirely as an unwritten personal understanding between Dr. Bhabha and PM Shastri.

On 11 January 1966, just hours after he had signed the Tashkent Declaration formalizing the end of hostilities in the war with Pakistan, PM Shastri died of a heart attack. Just two weeks later on January 24, and the very day Shastri’s successor Indira Gandhi was sworn in as Prime Minister, Dr. Homi Bhabha was killed while on a trip to Europe when the plane in which he was flying collided with Mount Blanc. India’s impressively large nuclear establishment was suddenly left without any official plan or policy, to give it direction.

Vikram Sarabhai was personally chosen by Indira Gandhi to be Chairman of the IAEC, and Secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy. Sarabhai was a follower of Mohandas Gandhi and a pacifist who opposed nuclear arms. His selection was probably politically motivated as Sarabhai hailed from a rich and politically powerful family.

India’s First Bomb

Late in 1967 the scientific leadership at BARC led by Homi Sethna and Raja Ramanna undertook a new effort to develop nuclear explosives, one that was larger and more intense than any previous efforts. One that would lead to the successful design of a nuclear device, a device that India would successfully test. India’s nuclear weapons program moved in to full swing with Raja Ramanna at the helm. Even with the peaceful cover story, India found it necessary to keep as a low a profile on the project as possible to avoid inevitable attempts by other nations to obstruct it by denying access to nuclear technology and knowledge.

The scientific leadership approved the plan for a new nuclear reactor to be called ‘Purnima’ in jan, 1969. Attending this meeting was Iyengar, Ramanna, Homi Sethna, and Sarabhai. Sarabhai’s presence clearly indicates that with or without formal approval, the work at BARC toward weapon design now had Sarabhai’s support. Purnima went critical on 18 May 1972. With Purnima as a test bed the Indian physicists were able to refine their understanding of the physics of fast fission and fast neutrons. 1970 saw expansion of the nuclear weapons program in many ways. The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War influenced India’s resolve to test a nuclear device, but in a curious and indirect way. On 30 December 1971 Sarabhai died, and Homi Sethna – already head of BARC – took his place as chairman of the IAEC. Thus the only prominent voice in Indian government counciling restraint in pursuing the nuclear option was replaced by one of its most ardent advocates.

By the beginning of 1972 the basic design for India’s first nuclear device was complete, and other parts of the program for developing the necessary expertise to implement the design were coming along. The decision to go ahead and manufacture the device and prepare for a test was made later in the year, while Indira Gandhi was still near the peak of her post-war popularity. One change made by Sethna soon after assuming the chairmanship was to split the Indian space program, then part of the Department of Atomic Energy, into a separate agency – observing quite reasonably that to have the DAE developing both nuclear explosives and missile technology would wave a red flag for observers concerned about proliferation, no matter what claims were made about the peaceful intent of both programs. Throughout the development of this device, more formally dubbed the “Peaceful Nuclear Explosive” or PNE, but commonly called Smiling Buddha, very few records of any kind were kept either on the development process or the decision making involved in its development and testing. In keeping with the great secrecy involved in India’s efforts to develop and test its first nuclear explosive device, the project employed no more than 75 scientists and engineers working on it in the period from 1967 to 1974.

The completed core (probably packed as separate pieces) was transported to Pokhran from Trombay under the direct supervision of Chidambaram and Roy. In the wake of the test, the scientists that had produced it became national heroes. In 1975 Setha, Ramanna, and Nag Chaudhuri received the Padma Vibhushan — India’s second highest civilian award. Iyengar, Chidambaram, Venkatesan, Dastidar, and Seshadri received the third highest award, the Padma Shri. The “Smiling Buddha” device was manufactured from plutonium produced at the Cirus reactor at BARC. The basic design had been developed by 1972, when manufacture of the test device began at PM Gandhi’s order. It took two years to separate, purify, and fabricate the plutonium metal, and to manufacture the implosion lens systems and associated electronics. Most of the work was done at BARC, but the explosive lenses were made by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO).

International embargo on Nuclear program

International reaction was negative, but varied. International reaction was negative, but

varied. The test sharply escalated international attention to proliferation, and support for India’s nuclear program from abroad disappeared.

Canada cut off virtually all nuclear assistance four days after the test, bringing two nuclear power projects – Rajasthan II reactor and the Kota heavy water plant – to a halt. Indeed the nuclear non-proliferation regime that exists today came about as a direct result of this test. The impact of the test on India’s civilian nuclear program was severe. The civilian nuclear power program had struggled for years to gain credibility, its progress crippled by the lack of indigenous resources and almost wholly dependent on imported technology and technical assistance. No effort had gone into analyzing the likely international reaction to the PNE, or in preparing the nuclear power program for the effects of an embargo.

In 1977 work began on a new larger 100 MW plutonium production reactor at Trombay named R-5, but usually called “Dhruva” (other accounts place the start of the Dhruva project in 1973 – possibly indicating a preliminary phase of planning). Efforts to rectify the severe shortage of heavy water had mixed success. In 1976 and 1977 assurances of 200 tonnes were obtained from the Soviets, the first 50 tonnes without safeguards, but for the rest India was forced to accept safeguard monitoring. In late 1977 the Baroda heavy water plant went on-line but in December it suffered an explosion and had to be shut down. India’s civilian nuclear power program, already more than a decade behind schedule, fell even further behind.

1979 witnessed additional events that adversely shifted the Pakistani situation in the eyes of India. In March U.S. intelligence announced that the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant in Pakistan had been commissioned. On 4 April the hard line nature of Zia-ul-Haq’s regime was emphasized when former prime minister Bhutto was hanged. Finally on 25 December the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, ensuring that despite its nuclear weapons program Pakistan would be the beneficiary of a massive infusion of U.S. weaponry, as well as U.S. economic and diplomatic support. The possibility that the U.S. would impose sanctions of any kind on Pakistan to undermine its nuclear program became slim, then nil when the aggressively anti-Soviet Reagan administration came to power. By this time concern over China had faded from view, and relations between India and China were becoming warmer.

In May 1982, the time had arrived to decide whether to conduct the new nuclear tests. For the first time a leader of the Indian armed forces, Army Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao, was pushing for the nuclear option. On the other hand both Gandhi and the Reagan administration were working on a rapprochement to improve Indian-U.S. relations, and this time PM Gandhi was very much aware of India’s vulnerability to likely international repercussions. Gandhi had also introduced a new element into the nuclear decision making process. Up until them Gandhi had held the portfolio of Defense Minister herself, now she transferred it to Ramaswami Venkataraman, a highly experienced, highly respected, and politically savvy senior official. Now a powerful and independent source of counsel, well aware of political and foreign policy implications, had been added to the nuclear decision making process. Unfortunately this was not the shape of things to come, while nuclear decisions in the future tended to have a broader institutional base than they had up through Smiling Buddha and afterward, up at least until the 1998 Shakti tests a formal policy making apparatus never became established and decisions (including the 1998 decision to test) remained ad hoc. The key role of the threat of international sanctions is borne out by the fact that Indira Gandhi never revisited her decision after her rejection, refusing to permit even a rehearing of the matter even as the security situation with Pakistan grew more serious over the next three years and the growing interest within the military for exercising the nuclear option.

Despite Gandhi’s rejection of testing, India’s nuclear infrastructure continued to advance. One of the most notable achievements of the new leadership provided by Venkataraman and Arunachalam was the establishment of an ambitious ballistic missile program in 1983 that would lead to the successful development of the short range Prithvi missile, and the long range Agni missile series that are a key element of India’s nuclear arsenal today. The new missile effort was based at DRDL and was led by Dr. Avil Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam, and extremely talented engineer and project manager who had been instrumental in the success of the SLV-3 program. Kalam had been transferred to DRDL in 1982 at the instigation of Raja Ramanna, and in 1983 had put together an ambitious development program for five missiles based on a family of related technologies. Venkatarman not only endorsed the program, he encouraged Kalam to be even more aggressive and develop all of the missiles in parallel rather than one at a time. In August 1983 the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) was born with a budget of 38.8 billion rupees ($370 million).

Rajiv Gandhi’s general orientation was toward technology and modern technological culture, thus he took great interest in the technical aspects of issues and actively promoted technological advance. He had a strong antipathy to nuclear weapons and did not support testing or deploy, and the refinement of weapon designs, and laboratory research required to support further advances in nuclear arms. His policies toward nuclear weapons thus were basically a continuation of the approach of his mother during her second term in office. Also like Indira Gandhi in her later years he had an ambivalent relationship with the scientific leadership at BARC – supporting their work but treating their advice skeptically, leaning perhaps even farther toward skepticism than Indira. In large part his opposition to proceeding with testing or deployment was because of his technology orientation. Rajiv recognized that India needed access to the advanced technology of the United States and that detectable progress toward acquiring nuclear weapons would slam many of those doors shut.

During Rajiv Gandhi’s term in office infrastructure was developed to support the manufacture of more sophisticated lightweight fission weapons. In 1984 India had imported 100 kg of high purity beryllium from West Germany, enough to provide the neutron reflecting tampers for a dozen or more weapons, but now India commissioned its own beryllium production plant in Mumbai, drawing on indigenous ores from Kerala. Around this time India also acquired a vacuum hot pressing machine, suitable for forming large high-quality beryllium forgings. Work also began at BARC to lay the foundation from thermonuclear weapon development and the manufacture of boosted fission weapons. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) announced that it would develop an inertial confinement fusion facility, a research tool that produces on a small scale physical conditions similar to those found in thermonuclear weapons. BARC also began manufacturing tritium by irradiating lithium in nuclear reactors, useful for neutron initiators and boosting fuel for fission weapons; and developing the capability of isotope enrichment of lithium – useful for tritium production and as fusion fuel for thermonuclear weapons. Throughout Rajiv Gandhi’s term in office the BARC and DRDO establishments continued to develop and refine weapon designs and related technologies in the laboratory and the testing ground, much as they had since the early 60s. This was standard operating procedure within the nuclear establishment, they felt within their authority to proceed with weapon development without specific direction from the administration as long as they didn’t proceed with the final assembly of a device.

India’s first effort to formulate a nuclear policy and the determine the means needed to implement it was an informal but authoritative study group that was set up in November 1985 to answer queries by Rajiv Gandhi regarding defense planning. It encompassed the three services (Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Tahliani, Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. K. Sundarji, Deputy Cheif of Air Staff John Greene), leaders of BARC (Ramanna), the DRDO (Abdul Kalam), and the AEC (Chidambaram), and India’s most prominent strategic analyst K. Subrahmanyam. The outcome of the group’s deliberations was to recommend building a minimum deterrent force with a strict no first use policy. The arsenal envisioned was 70 to 100 warheads, and would require a 9% boost to the defense budget for 10 years to finance (about $5.6 billion).

Crippled by international sanctions imposed after the 1974 nuclear test, India’s civilian nuclear power program fell further behind objectives throughout the 80s. One possible avenue for bolstering the program was to import nuclear reactors from supplier countries (like Russia) which were available on the condition that India operate them under IAEA safeguards. The weapons establishment, maintaining their obsession with nuclear technology as a symbol of national pride, vigorously opposed taking this step. Two dramatic changes altered the strategic environment for India in 1988. The first was the Soviet decision in February 1988 to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, a move that removed the geopolitical rationale for the U.S. support for the military regime, and the reluctance to pressure Pakistan on account of its nuclear weapons program. The second change was on 17 August 1988, when President Zia Ul-Haq, the architect of the militarization of the nuclear program, was killed along with thirty other people, when the aircraft in which he was travelling crashed in what is suspected to be an assassination. 1989 marked a turning point in the strategic situation in South Asia because it was in this year that Pakistan, and in response India, began creating real nuclear arsenals by stockpiling complete, ready-to-assemble weapons. Throughout the 80s, due to its strategic importance the U.S. had been loathe to pressure on its nuclear weapons program.

The Indian missile programs were also reaching fruition. The first test flight of the 150 km Prithvi tactical missile with a 1000 kg payload had occurred on 18 February 1988. The Army was committed to developing and procuring the Prithvi in April 1989 with a budget of 580 million rupees. The Agni MRBM had its first test flight on 22 May 1989, a successful launch in which it carried a 1000 kg payload 800 km. India described the Agni at this stage as a “technology demonstrator” which is precisely what it was. There was no intention to deploy this version of the Agni as a weapon delivery system.

November 1989 saw a change in India’s government, with Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress (I) Party being replaced by V.P. Singh and a coalition led by Singh’s Janata Dal party. Pakistan’s decision to manufacture nuclear weapons, and India’s earlier decision to do the same (even if they were not fully assembled), prompted PM V.P. Singh to convene a secret study group in September 1990 to wrestle with the thorny issues of how to establish a National Command Authority, that is, how to formulate procedures so that the nation’s nuclear arsenal would remain under effective control and leadership in the event of a surprise “decapitation attack” – a nuclear strike that kills the entire central government. The study group was not able to report its findings before Singh’s government collapsed on 7 November amid widespread Hindu-Muslim violence fomented by the VHP and BJP, but was eventually able to hand its conclusions in to PM Narasimha Rao after his election in 1991. Despite this preliminary attempt to address some of the issues resulting from a nuclearized South Asia, no effort had been made yet to formulate an actual nuclear doctrine – policies and strategies defining how India would manage this new capability.

PM Rao placed a strong emphasis on economic development, closer ties to the West in the aftermath of the Soviet Bloc’s collapse, and instituted a strikingly effective economic program based on liberalization of the economy. He was thus strongly against overt declarations of nuclear capability that would incur crippling sanctions. The U.S. accommodated this approach by shifting its emphasis away from pressuring India to a more cooperative and conciliatory arrangement. The shift away from supporting Pakistan made this easier, and it had become clear that efforts to restrain India’s nuclear and missile development programs had at best limited success. For better or worse India now had the capability of fielding a nuclear arsenal at will, and there was no chance it would volunteer to relinquish it. Thus the best prospect of influencing India’s behavior was one of engagement.

This change in tone can by the first ever joint naval exercise conducted between the U.S. and India in May 1992. During this exercise (29 May 1992) India conducted the second test of the Agni (a failure), but the U.S. had been notified in advance of the test, and issued only a muted and mildly critical note about the test. The Prithvi program continued to advance. On 18 August 1992 the ninth flight test of the Prithvi system was conducted. This was the second flight test of an extended 250 km version, and the first fully instrumented flight of this version.

P.K. Iyengar’s term as chairman on the Indian AEC expired on 31 January 1993, and he was replaced by Rajagopala Chidambaram, a fellow nuclear weaponeer from BARC. Chidambaram had participated in the 1974 test, but had received little recognition at the time. Now as head of India’s nuclear establishment he made it his mission to build on all the preparatory work that had gone on since the 80s on thermonuclear weapons, and push ahead with the development and testing of a hydrogen bomb. Chidambaram at the Indian AEC and Avil Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam (aka A.P.J. Kalam, Abdul Kalam) at the DRDO, which had become a major power center for strategic system development, formed an effective team intent on rapidly advancing India’s nuclear capabilities, and making India a recognized nuclear power.

On 19 February 1994 Agni took its third test flight at the Indian missile test range at Balasore, this time successfully with its range extended to 1200 km. The third flight marked the end of the first phase of Agni development program. The program went into a period of dormancy while the new Agni II began development, a longer range version that replaced the liquid fuel upper stage with a solid fuel version to make an all solid fuel missile. India became a nuclear weapon state in reality in May 1994, though most observers thought that this milestone had been passed years before. It was then that India completed its development of a fully combat ready system for delivering nuclear weapons by successfully conducting acceptance tests. The ARDE developed bomb case, and the TBRL developed implosion system were mated with a modified Mirage 2000 and successfully test dropped at Balasore. The bomb, complete except for its plutonium core, was fuzed for an airburst and released over the ocean. If it been required due to national crisis, no doubt the system could have been pushed into service at an earlier date as a stop gap, but in May the fully mature reliable and safe system entered service. India now had an arsenal of at least a couple of dozen operational nuclear bombs.

The years 1995-1996 proved to be watershed in the history of South Asia, and in nuclear proliferation efforts world-wide. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came up for review and extension in 1995. Since its original drafting in 1968 the NPT had steadily gained adherents until by the mid-90s the vast majority of states in the world had signed it (by 2000 only 4 states out of 191 had not signed it – with India and Pakistan being half of the four).

India had endorsed the NPT in principle, but had refrained from signing because it objected to the establishment of “legitimate” nuclear weapon states limited to the 5 nuclear armed nations then in existence. The NPT committed these nuclear states to good faith efforts at eliminating their arsenals but in the nearly 30 years since no effort in that direction could be discerned. India refused to sign the NPT unless the nuclear states committed themselves to a specific timetable to accomplish disarmament, an approach they unanimously refused to consider. As the NPT extension date approached the nuclear states began pressing for making the NPT permanent so that it would never expire again, while the non-nuclear signatories to the treaty began insisting on a firmer commitment to arms limitation from the nuclear powers in return. In lieu of an actual disarmament commitment, the nuclear powers pushed two treaties that provided for restrictions on specific proliferation activities – the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to prohibit all nuclear tests, and a treaty to cut-off the production of fissile materials for weapons. Neither of these treaties would seriously inconvenience the states already possessing extensive stockpiles of tested weapons, but they would have serious effects on states with less well developed arsenals – like India.

This situation presented India with the worst of all worlds. They found themselves under intense pressure, particularly from the U.S., to assent to these treaties which would lock them in to a permanent status of a “second tier state”, sharply constrain or wholly foreclose their nuclear capabilities developed at great expense which were now at a stage of advanced development. To add further insult, two of the nuclear states – China and France – embarked on a new round of nuclear tests to add still more sophisticated designs to their arsenals before the CTBT shut down all testing. The linkage between U.S. pressure on the NPT and India’s decision to move ahead aggressively on its strategic programs seems to have been quite direct. The full court press for the NPT began in January 1995, PM Rao responded by meeting with Chidambaram and authorized him to prepare to conduct a series of tests, including a hydrogen bomb test device and sub-kiloton devices to provide data for post-CTBT weapon simulations. Rao even specified that the scientists should be ready to conduct a test on 10 days notice. Later, on 13 April 1995, Rao authorized 6 billion rupees for the development of the Agni II. Kalam was directed to intensify work on setting up a sophisticated command and control system for India’s nuclear weapons, and to build additional weapon storage sites around the country (the nuclear components for weapons were all stored at BARC in Trombay).

The NPT extension passed overwhelmingly on 11 May, four days later on 15 May China conducted another nuclear test, and the next day PM Rao announced that India was considering deploying the Prithvi missile in the near future. Rao had never actually authorized tests though, simply preparations for them to keep his options open. Unlike in 1974, PM Rao conducted an extensive series of reviews to determine involving political, foreign policy, and economic advisers (but, in keeping with long-standing Indian practice, not the military) in addition to the nuclear scientists and engineers to determine whether tests should be conducted. Although the nuclear scientists, and members of the “strategic enclave” (like Sundarji and Subrahmanyam) strongly advocated tests, the net result of the reviews were negative, by the fall Rao had decided not to conduct tests. The principle reason for not testing were again economic, Rao recognized the principle source of China’s international clout was its economic strength and that India needed to focus its energies on its economy to compete. Thus when the news that the U.S. had detected test preparations broke in the press in December, actual tests were no longer under consideration and test devices had never been transported to Pokhran.

The summer of 1996 was the “summer of the CTBT” for India’s foreign policy. The negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were drawing to a close, and although India had supported the treaty in principle for many years, as the debate on the final draft moved toward a conclusion India became increasingly critical of it. The treaty conference had been structured to require unanimous consent and on 14 August India announced that it opposed to treaty, blocking its adoption. A parliamentary maneuver subsequently side-stepped India’s obstruction when the draft treaty was introduced directly into the UN General Assembly on 9 September 1996 by Australia and approved by voice vote the next day. It was adopted by a vote of 158 to 3, only India, Bhutan and Libya voted against it. Pakistan, which had said that it would sign the CTBT only if India did, abstained from voting. As one of the 44 nations possessing nuclear reactors, the CTBT cannot go into effect without India’s signature however.

During Gowda’s term in office Foreign Minister Gujral conducted a very active and successful foreign policy under Gowda – improving Indian relations with China, Pakistan, the minor states bordering India, and last but not least the United States. Also India’s growing strength commanded greater attention by all parties.

The deployment of the Prithvi was detected by U.S. intelligence in June, during Gujral’s term in office, and brought about a diplomatic protest. Gujral downplayed its significance, pointing out that Pakistan had stored Chinese-made M-11 missiles of similar range at Sargoda, about 200 km from the Indo-Pak border. Gujral opposed nuclear tests and never approved them. Curiously enough though he did allow additional test preparations at Pokhran by authorizing a sixth shaft to be dug there in July. A most telling (and often quoted) exchange between PM Gujral and Pres. Clinton occurred on 22 September 1997 at the occasion of the U.N. General Assembly session in New York. Gujral later recounted telling Clinton that an old Indian saying holds that Indians have a third eye. “I told President Clinton that when my third eye looks at the door of the Security Council chamber it sees a little sign that says ‘only those with economic power or nuclear weapons allowed.’ I said to him, ‘it is very difficult to achieve economic wealth’.”

Gujral decided to make a statement by awarding India’s highest civilian award – the Bharat Ratna – to Abdul Kalam. The last time this award had been granted to a scientist was 1952 when it was posthumously awarded to Nobel laureate C.V. Raman. He made the proposal to President K.R. Narayanan on 3 November 1997, who readily agreed. This was also an award that had been rarely received by a Muslim like Kalam. The Bharat Ratna was actually awarded to Kalam on 1 March 1998.

During the last several years the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party, or BJP) has emerged as the dominant power in domestic politics. One of its key platform issues has been its desire to make India an openly declared nuclear power. The BJP created a short-lived government for 13 days in May 1996, and it is now known that Vajpayee actually authorized nuclear tests at that time, and the devices got as far as being placed in the test shafts, before he called them off when it became evident that his government was unlikely to survive long enough to deal with the aftermath. Two years later however, on 10 March 1998, the BJP achieved a strong electoral victory and finally succeeded in putting together a governing coalition of 13 (later 20) parties. The BJP wasted no time in making clear its intention to deploy nuclear weapons. On 18 March 1998, the day before he was sworn in as Prime Minister, PM-designate Vajpayee declared “There is no compromise on national security. We will exercise all options including nuclear options to protect security and sovereignty,”. An official planning report further stated directly that the new BJP government intended to “re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons”. Considering the numerous test preparations that had been detected over the past three years, and Vajpayee’s 1996 actual test authorization which was undoubtedly known to U.S. intelligence by that time, and after such announcements there would seem to be little excuse for being “surprised” by subsequent events.

Operation Shakti: 1998

Test Preparations

The nuclear devices were moved from their vaults at the BARC complex in Mumbai in the early morning hours of 1 May, around 3 a.m., by four Army trucks under the command of Col. Umang Kapur of the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organization). They were transported to Mumbai airport and flown at dawn in AN-32 transports to Jaisalmer airport, two hours away. An Army convoy of four trucks took the explosive devices to Pokhran, about an hours trip from the airport. Three trips were required to complete the delivery of the devices and associated equipment. The devices were delivered directly to the device preparation building which was designated Prayer Hall. Three laboratories of the DRDO were involved in designing, testing and producing components like advanced detonators, the implosion systems, high-voltage trigger systems. They were also responsible for weaponization — systems engineering, aerodynamics, safety interlocks and flight trials. The tests were organized into two groups that were fired separately, with all of the devices in a group fired at the same time. The first group consisted of the thermonuclear device, the fission bomb, and a sub-kiloton device, and two more sub-kiloton devices made up the second group.

The Tests Are Fired

The thermonuclear device was emplaced in the shaft code named White House (over 200 m deep), while the Taj Mahal shaft (over 150 m deep) was assigned to the fission bomb, and Kumbhkaran to the first sub-kiloton shot. The other three shafts for the second test series were designated NT 1,2, and 3. The Regiment 58 Engineers had learned a lot since 1995 about how to avoid detection by U.S. spy satellites. A lot of work was done at night, and heavy equipment was always returned to the same parking spot at dawn so that image analysts would conclude that they had never moved. Piles of sand were shaped to mimic the wind-aligned and shaped dune forms in the area. When cables were laid they were carefully covered and native vegetation replaced to conceal the digging. The first three devices were emplaced on 10 May, the day before the tests. The shafts were L-shaped, with a horizontal chamber for the test device. The Army engineers sealed the kunbhkaran shaft at 8:30 p.m. Thermonuclear device was placed in white house shaft, atomic bomb in taj mahal shaft and sealed by 7:30 a.m. , just 90 minutes from the planned test time. At 3:45 p.m. the three devices detonated.

On Monday, 11 May 1998, at 10:13:44.2 UCT (+/-0.32 sec; 6:13:44.2 a.m. EDT; 3:43:44.2 p.m. local) as measured by international seismic monitors, India declared itself a full fledged nuclear armed state. This was accomplished by the detonation of a thermonuclear weapon design, one of three nuclear devices with kiloton-range yields detonated simultaneously under the surface of the Thar desert of Rajasthan near the Indo-Pakistani border. This de facto declaration was followed shortly thereafter by an official one. In a hurriedly convened press conference Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said:

“I have an announcement to make: today at 3:45 p.m., India conducted three

underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range (in Rajasthan state).

These were contained explosions like the experiment conducted in May 1974.”

He went on to say that the devices tested were a thermonuclear device, a fission device, and a low-yield device. “I warmly congratulate the scientists and engineers who have carried out these successful tests,” Vajpayee added. Just two days later on 13 May, at 6:51 UCT (2:51 a.m. EST, 12.21 p.m. local Indian time) India detonated two more sub-kiloton nuclear devices underground before declaring that the test series was completed. The test series was dubbed Operation Shakti-98 (Power-98) and the five tests are designated Shakti I through V. Like the 1974 test’s moniker “Smiling Buddha”, this name seems to have been stuck on the test series after the fact. The test operation itself apparently did not have a formal name. More recently it has been common to refer to the five shot test series as Pokhran II, the 1974 shot being Pokhran I.

The Indian government held a triumphal press conference with the entire scientific and engineering leadership three days after the second group of tests. This conference was notable, even unprecedented, in the level of detail about the tests that was released – discussing yields and the general characteristics of the devices. By comparison the US and USSR/Russia has kept the exact yields and purpose the vast number underground shots dating back to the early 1960s classified up to the present day. Most of the information was conveyed by two top officials — Drs. Avil (Abdul) Pakir Jainulabdeen Kalam, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and head of the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organization), and Rajagopala Chidambaram, chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Department of Atomic energy (DAE).

Initial Reactions and International Responses

After the Indian tests were reported Pakistani Foreign Minister Ayub initially stopped short of saying that Pakistan would conduct a nuclear test of its own, but said “We in Pakistan will maintain a balance with India in all fields… We are in a headlong arms race on the subcontinent.”

After a day of silence China’s initial reaction was muted. Beijing warned that India’s nuclear tests would harm peace and stability in South Asia. China is “seriously concerned” about the tests, the state-run Xinhua News Agency said in a brief report quoting Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao.

In general world reaction was strongly disapproving. “The United States is deeply disappointed by the decision of the government of India to conduct three nuclear tests,” President Clinton’s spokesman Mike McCurry said. “This runs counter to the effort the international community is making to promulgate a comprehensive ban on such testing.” “The United States intends to address its concern directly to New Delhi,” McCurry said. “We will continue to spare no effort in encouraging countries to both promulgate and ratify the comprehensive test ban. If anything, these tests underscore the importance of that international regime.”

In keeping with its preferred approach to foreign policy in recent decades, the US imposed economic sanctions of India as punishment. In fact a 1994 anti-proliferation law made such action virtually automatic. Most other nations refrained from joining the US in imposing an economic embargo. Since most nations are not imposing similar sanctions, and India’s exports and imports together constitute only 4% of its GDP, with US trade being only 10% of this total, the overall effect on India’s economy from a direct trade embargo was small. Far more significant were the restrictions on lending imposed by the United States and its representatives on international finance bodies.

On 25 May it was reported by the Associated Press and Reuters that U.S. intelligence officials had said that Pakistani preparations had accelerated in recent days at a site called Raskoh in the Chagai Hills (it later transpired that Ras Koh was indeed the test area, but Ras Koh is a separate mountain range over 40 km from the Chagai Hills area). Tunneling activities and the setup of explosive monitoring equipment had been observed. “At this point, they could conduct a nuclear test at any time,” said one official. On 28 May at 15:00 UCT: PM Sharif announced that Pakistan has detonated five nuclear devices.

Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine

On 17 August 1999, India took the major – though belated step – toward formalizing its declared status as a nuclear power by issuing a six-page document detailing a proposed doctrine governing its nuclear arsenal, entitled the “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine”. The report, which was prepared by a government-appointed advisory board, was made public Tuesday by National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra.

The essential points of this doctrine were that India asserted a right to possess nuclear weapons, and would pursue a policy of credible “minimum” nuclear deterrence and use nuclear weapons only to retaliate against a first strike. According to the draft, “Any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.” “India’s peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat,” the draft said. It further stated that India would not use nuclear weapons against a state that does not have them or is not aligned with a nuclear-armed power, and that nuclear weapons would be tightly controlled and launched only with the authorization of the prime minister, or a designated successor.

The draft did not mention the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but it criticized the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, saying it legitimized the possession of nuclear weapons by states that already had them. The official U.S. State Department reaction given by Spokesman James P. Rubin was that India was “moving in the wrong direction” by trying to create a credible nuclear deterrence. Rubin said “We think it would be unwise to move in the direction of developing a nuclear deterrent and encouraging the other country to develop a nuclear deterrent and thereby creating an action-reaction cycle that will increase the risks to both countries.” Unlike from the U.S., the initial reaction from Europe was cautious. France welcomed the draft doctrine as a logical consequence of the decision to develop nuclear weapons.

China also condemned the document; and Pakistan, which 15 months ago matched India’s nuclear tests with its own, said it would soon be matching India’s doctrine with a published doctrine of its own.

Indo-US relations: A Paradigm Shift

With the fading of cold war constraints, the United States and India began exploring the possibilities for a more normalized relationship between the world’s two largest democracies. A visit to the United States by Indian PM Narasimha Rao in 1994 marked the onset of significantly improved U.S.-India relations. Rao addressed a joint session of Congress and met with President Clinton. Although discussions were held on nuclear nonproliferation,

human rights, and other issues, the main focus of the visit was rapidly expanding U.S.-India

economic relations. Throughout the 1990s, however, regional rivalries, separatist tendencies,

and sectarian tensions continued to divert India’s attention and resources from economic and

social development. Fallout from these unresolved problems – particularly nuclear

proliferation and human rights issues – presented serious irritants in bilateral relations. President Clinton’s 2000 visit to South Asia seemed a major U.S. initiative to improve

cooperation with India in the areas of economic ties, regional stability, nuclear proliferation

concerns, security and counterterrorism, environmental protection, clean energy production,

and disease control. President Clinton and Indian PM Vajpayee agreed to institutionalize

dialogue between the two countries through a range of high-level exchanges, and the two

countries established working groups and agreements on numerous issues of mutual concern,

from increasing bilateral trade to combating global warming. President Clinton also lifted

sanctions on some small U.S. assistance programs.

In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, India took the immediate and unprecedented step of offering to the United States full cooperation and the use of India’s bases for counterterrorism operations. The offer reflected the sea change that has occurred in recent years in the U.S.-India relationship, which for decades was mired in the politics of the Cold War. The marked improvement of relations that began in the latter months of the Clinton Administration was accelerated after a November 2001 meeting between President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee at the White House, when the two leaders agreed to greatly expand U.S.-India cooperation on a wide range of issues, including counterterrorism, regional security, space and scientific collaboration, civilian nuclear safety, and broadened economic ties. Notable progress has come in the area of security cooperation, with an increasingly strong focus on counterterrorism, joint military exercises, and arms sales. In December 2001, the U.S. Defense Policy Group met in New Delhi for the first time since India’s 1998 nuclear tests and outlined a defense partnership based on regular and high-level policy dialogue.

A joint statement was issued during this visit by Vajpayee. They noted that both countries are targets of terrorism, as seen in the barbaric attacks on 11^th September in the United States and on 1^st October in Kashmir.

They agreed that terrorism threatens not only the security of India and the United States, but also our efforts to build freedom, democracy and international security and stability around the world. As leaders of the two largest multi-cultural democracies, they emphasized that those who equate terrorism with any religion are as wrong as those who invoke its name to commit, support or justify terrorist acts. They affirmed that the current campaign against the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban in Afghanistan is an important step in a global war against terrorism and its sponsors everywhere in the world. They recognized that the international community will have to wage a long and multi-faceted struggle against terrorism, with patience, determination and unwavering focus. They emphasized that there is only one choice and only one outcome: terrorism must be fought and it shall be defeated.

Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Bush agreed that success in this endeavor would depend heavily on building international cooperation and securing the unambiguous commitment of all nations to share information and intelligence on terrorists and deny them support, sustenance and safe havens. The two leaders agreed to consult regularly on the future of Afghanistan. They welcomed the measures outlined in the UNSCR 1373 and called on all nations to ratify and implement existing UN Conventions on counter-terrorism. They expressed support for India’s draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and urged the resolution of outstanding issues to enable its adoption by the UNGA. The leaders of the two countries expressed satisfaction with the progress made in India-US cooperation on counter-terrorism, including the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism established in January 2000. They reaffirmed their personal commitment, and that of their two countries, to intensify bilateral cooperation as a critical element in the global effort against terrorism. They also announced the establishment of a Joint Cyber-Terrorism Initiative.

Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Bush agreed that developments in Afghanistan have a direct impact on its entire neighborhood. They emphasized that the Taliban and the Al Qaida network have turned Afghanistan into a centre of terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking and have brought immense suffering to the Afghan people. They agreed that a peaceful, progressive and prosperous Afghanistan requires a broad-based government, representing all ethnic and religious groups, friendly with all countries in the neighborhood and beyond, as well as sizeable and sustained international assistance for Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction and development. The two leaders committed themselves to work together, and in partnership with other countries and international organizations to achieve these goals.

Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Bush affirmed their commitment to complete the process of qualitatively transforming India-US relations in pursuit of their many common goals in Asia and beyond. They agreed that India-US relations draw a strength from the broad political support that exists in both democracies. The two leaders agreed that the recent lifting of economic, military and technology restrictions on India provides a further impetus to bilateral relations.

They welcomed the resumption of the bilateral Defense Policy Group as a step toward increasing exchanges and technical cooperation in the defense and security areas. They noted that India’s interests in purchasing arms from the United States would be discussed at the Defense Policy Group meetings in December 2001. The two leaders agreed to pursue policies to enhance the mutually beneficial – and growing – economic and commercial ties between their nations. They also agreed to expand the Bilateral Economic Dialogue and to broaden dialogue and cooperation in the areas of energy, the environment, health, space, export controls, science and technology, including biotechnology and information technology. They agreed that the two sides should discuss ways to stimulate bilateral high technology commerce. They also agreed that the two sides should begin a dialogue between the two governments with a view towards evaluating the processes by which we transfer dual-use and military items, with a view towards greater transparency and efficiency. In addition, India and the United States have a mutual interest in Space and have agreed to initiate discussions on Civil Space cooperation.

The two leaders expressed confidence that enhancing their cooperation in all these areas will go far towards building a long-term partnership between India and the United States that will greatly benefit citizens of both their nations.

The Indo-US relations continued to improve with various types of cooperation in counterterrorism, maritime security, joint exercises of armed forces, military logistics, defense trade, non proliferation, science, space, education, medicine, avian influenza, and HIV/AIDS. Indo-US technology cooperation is the foundation on which the future of Indo-US relations stands. In particular, both the governments emphasize the importance of high-tech (including dual-use items) trade and commerce in strengthening current Indo-US ties. The improved cooperation culminated in the constitution of the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) in November 2002 to provide a standing framework (Statement of Principles) for discussing

high-technology issues of mutual concern. The growing competitiveness of Indian companies and the success of corporate India and its entry into the global arena provide an encouraging picture, which cannot be overlooked by the Americans. Moreover, India’s strength lies in its

knowledge and service-based industries such as information technology, health care, call centres, etc. Also, it has been predicted, “the low-cost, high-IQ, English speaking

brainpower of India may soon have a more far-reaching impact on the

US than China. Manufacturing – China’s strength – accounts for just 14 per cent

of US output and 11 per cent of jobs. India’s forte is services – which make up 60

per cent of the US economy and employ two-thirds of its workers.

Legislative elections were held in India between April 20 and May 10, 2004. On May 13, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party conceded defeat after the Indian National Congress was able to put together a majority with the help of its allies under the direction of Gandhi family matriarch, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi. This post-poll alliance was called the United Progressive Alliance. However, Mrs.Gandhi surprised almost all observers by declining to become the new prime minister, citing the division that her rule would bring. Instead, she asked former Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, well-respected economist, to take control of the new government. Singh had previously served under Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in the early-1990s, where he was seen as one of the architects of India’s first economic liberalization plan that staved off an impending national monetary crisis.

The September 21, 2004 meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush in New York alleviated US fears to a certain extent, regarding the recent regime change in India. Advocates of stronger Indo-US ties say that it is the “beginning of a new era of cooperation and trust.” As the Prime Minister himself said, “the best is yet to come”.

During the july, 2005 visit of PM Manmohan Singh to Washington, a milestone was reached in INDO-US relations. Both the leaders made a joint declaration to establish a global partnership:

FOR THE ECONOMY

• Revitalize the U.S.-India Economic Dialogue and launch a CEO Forum to harness private sector energy and ideas to deepen the bilateral economic relationship.
• Support and accelerate economic growth in both countries through greater trade, investment, and technology collaboration.
• Promote modernization of India’s infrastructure as a prerequisite for the continued growth of the Indian economy. As India enhances its investment climate, opportunities for investment will increase.
• Launch a U.S.-India Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture focused on promoting teaching, research, service and commercial linkages.

FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

• Strengthen energy security and promote the development of stable and efficient energy markets in India with a view to ensuring adequate, affordable energy supplies and conscious of the need for sustainable development. These issues will be addressed through the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue.
• Agree on the need to promote the imperatives of development and safeguarding the environment, commit to developing and deploying cleaner, more efficient, affordable, and diversified energy technologies.

FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

• Develop and support, through the new U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative in countries that seek such assistance, institutions and resources that strengthen the foundations that make democracies credible and effective. India and the U.S. will work together to strengthen democratic practices and capacities and contribute to the new U.N. Democracy Fund.
• Commit to strengthen cooperation and combat HIV/AIDs at a global level through an initiative that mobilizes private sector and government resources, knowledge, and expertise.

FOR NON-PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY

• Express satisfaction at the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship as a basis for future cooperation, including in the field of defense technology.
• Commit to play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The U.S. welcomed the adoption by India of legislation on WMD (Prevention of Unlawful Activities Bill).
• Launch a new U.S.-India Disaster Relief Initiative that builds on the experience of the Tsunami Core Group, to strengthen cooperation to prepare for and conduct disaster relief operations.

FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE

• Sign a Science and Technology Framework Agreement, building on the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), to provide for joint research and training, and the establishment of public-private partnerships.
• Build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena through mechanisms such as the U.S.-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation.
• Building on the strengthened nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the NSSP, to remove certain Indian organizations from the Department of Commerce’s Entity List.

Recognizing the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner, the two leaders discussed India’s plans to develop its civilian nuclear energy program. President Bush conveyed his appreciation to the Prime Minister over India’s strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation and stated that as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. The President told the Prime Minister that he will work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security. The President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, and the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur. In the meantime, the United States will encourage its partners to also consider this request expeditiously. India has expressed its interest in ITER and a willingness to contribute. The United States will consult with its partners considering India’s participation. The United States will consult with the other participants in the Generation IV International Forum with a view toward India’s inclusion.

The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.

The two leaders also reiterated their commitment that their countries would play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

In light of this closer relationship, and the recognition of India’s growing role in enhancing regional and global security, the Prime Minister and the President agree that international institutions must fully reflect changes in the global scenario that have taken place since 1945. The President reiterated his view that international institutions are going to have to adapt to reflect India’s central and growing role. The two leaders state their expectations that India and the United States will strengthen their cooperation in global forums.

The best ever cordial relations and cooperation was enhanced by US President George Bush’s visit to India in March 2006. Consistent with this objective, the two leaders highlighted efforts the United States and India are making together in the following areas, where they have:

For economic prosperity and trade

(1) Agreed to intensify efforts to develop a bilateral business climate supportive of trade and investment by:

1. Welcoming the report of the US-India CEO Forum, agreeing to consider its recommendations aimed at substantially broadening our bilateral economic relations, and directing the Chairs of the Indo-U.S. Economic Dialogue to follow up expeditiously with the CEO Forum;

2. Endorsing the efforts of the US-India Trade Policy Forum to reduce barriers to trade and investment with the goal of doubling bilateral trade in three years;

3. Agreeing to advance mutually beneficial bilateral trade and investment flows by holding a high-level public-private investment summit in 2006, continuing efforts to facilitate and promote foreign direct investment and eliminate impediments to it, and enhancing bilateral consultations on various issues including tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services, and preventing the illicit use of the financial system.

(2) Sought to expand cooperation in agriculture by:

1. Launching the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture with a three-year financial commitment to link our universities, technical institutions, and businesses to support agriculture education, joint research, and capacity building projects including in the area of biotechnology.

2. Endorsing an agreed workplan to promote bilateral trade in agriculture through agreements that: lay out a path to open the US market to Indian mangoes, recognize India as having the authority to certify that shipments of Indian products to the United States meet USDA organic standards, and provide for discussions on current regulations affecting trade in fresh fruits and vegetables, poultry and dairy, and almonds.

(3) Reaffirmed their shared commitment to completing the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA) before the end of 2006, and agreed to work together to help achieve this outcome.

For energy security and a clean environment

(1) Welcomed the successful completion of discussions on India’s separation plan and looked forward to the full implementation of the commitments in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation. This historic accomplishment will permit our countries to move forward towards our common objective of full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States and between India and the international community as a whole.

(2) Welcomed the participation of India in the ITER initiative on fusion energy as an important further step towards the common goal of full nuclear energy cooperation.

(3) Agreed on India’s participation in FutureGen, an international public-private partnership to develop new, commercially viable technology for a clean coal near-zero emission power project. India will contribute funding to the project and participate in the Government Steering Committee of this initiative.

(4) Welcomed the creation of the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, which will enable India and the US to work together with other countries in the region to pursue sustainable development and meet increased energy needs while addressing concerns of energy security and climate change. The Partnership will collaborate to promote the development, diffusion, deployment and transfer of cleaner, cost-effective and more efficient technologies and practices.

(5) Welcomed India’s interest in the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program, an international marine research endeavor that will contribute to long-term energy solutions such as gas hydrates.

(6) Noting the positive cooperation under the Indo-US Energy Dialogue, highlighted plans to hold joint conferences on topics such as energy efficiency and natural gas, to conduct study missions on renewable energy, to establish a clearing house in India for coal-bed methane/coal-mine methane, and to exchange energy market information.

For innovation and the knowledge economy

(1) Emphasizing the importance of knowledge partnerships, announced the establishment of a Bi-National Science and Technology Commission which the US and India will co-fund. It will generate collaborative partnerships in science and technology and promote industrial research and development.

(2) Agreed that the United States and India would work together to promote innovation, creativity and technological advancement by providing a vibrant intellectual property rights regime, and to cooperate in the field of intellectual property rights to include capacity building activities, human resource development and public awareness programs.

(3) Agreed to continue exploring further cooperation in civil space, including areas such as space exploration, satellite navigation, and earth science. The United States and India committed to move forward with agreements that will permit the launch of US satellites and satellites containing US components by Indian space launch vehicles, opening up new opportunities for commercial space cooperation between the two countries.

(4) Welcomed the inclusion of two US instruments in the Indian lunar mission Chandrayaan-1. They noted that memoranda of understanding to be signed by ISRO and NASA would be significant steps forward in this area.

(5) Welcomed the US Department of Commerce’s plan to create a license exception for items that would otherwise require an export license to end-users in India engaged solely in civilian activities.

For global safety and security

(1) Noted the enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries and stressed that terrorism is a global scourge that must be fought and rooted out in every part of the world.

(2) Welcomed the increased cooperation between the United States and India in the defense area, since the New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship was signed on June 28, 2005, as evidenced by successful joint exercises, expanded defence cooperation and information sharing, and greater opportunities to jointly develop technologies and address security and humanitarian issues.

(3) Reaffirmed their commitment to the protection of the free flow of commerce and to the safety of navigation, and agreed to the conclusion of a Maritime Cooperation Framework to enhance security in the maritime domain, to prevent piracy and other transnational crimes at sea, carry out search and rescue operations, combat marine pollution, respond to natural disasters, address emergent threats and enhance cooperative capabilities, including through logistics support. Both sides are working to finalize a Logistics Support Agreement at the earliest.

(4) Welcomed India’s intention to join the Container Security Initiative aimed at making global maritime trade and infrastructure more secure and reducing the risk of shipping containers being used to conceal weapons of mass destruction.

(5) Reiterated their commitment to international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(6) Building on the July 2005 Disaster Relief Initiative, noted the important disaster management cooperation and their improved capabilities to respond to disaster situations.

(7) Recognized the importance of capacity building in cyber security and greater cooperation to secure their growing electronic interdependencies, including to protect electronic transactions and critical infrastructure from cybercrime, terrorism and other malicious threats.

Deepening democracy and meeting international challenges

(1) Recalled their joint launch of the UN Democracy Fund in September 2005 and offered the experience and expertise of both Governments for capacity building, training and exchanges to third countries that request such assistance to strengthen democratic institutions.

(2) Welcomed the decision of India and the United States to designate a representative to the Government Advisory Board of the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) located in Budapest to facilitate cooperative activities with ICDT.

(3) Agreed that the Virtual Coordination and Information Centres set up in September 2005 should be further strengthened and a bilateral meeting aimed at developing a practical program for utilization of its services be held soon.

(4) Expressed satisfaction at the expedited USFDA drug approval processes that strengthen the combat against HIV/AIDS at the global level and encourage greater corporate participation to meet this challenge, including the establishment of the Indo-U.S. Corporate Fund for HIV/AIDS.

(5) Agreed to expand bilateral efforts and continue cooperation in the area of medical research and strengthen technical capacity in food and drug regulation in India as well as address the concern on avian influenza, including agreement to reach out to the private sector, develop regional communications strategies, and plan an in-region containment and response exercise. The President welcomed India’s offer to host the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza meeting in 2007.

(6) Welcomed India’s membership in the Coalition Against Wildlife Trafficking, a partnership through which we will collaborate in the fight against illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife parts; we also welcome the opportunity to strengthen longstanding work together on the conservation of wildlife through cooperation on park management and ecotourism.

The much awaited Nuclear Cooperation

In keeping with the commitments of the joint statements, the U.S. congress passed a domestic act named after veteran congressman Henry J. Hyde which allows and governs the U.S. administration in starting the civil nuclear cooperation with India. India and U.S. negotiated an international agreement called 123 agreement which would be binding on both the countries and has to be ratified by both Indian Parliament and U.S. Congress. India will have to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) and 45 nation Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) will have to make a special waiver for India in order to enable nuclear commerce with other countries. India will place 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards and option to inspection by IAEA inspectors. Under the terms of the deal India will be able to maintain and enhance its military nuclear capability without any interference and military reactors are exempted from any kind of safeguards or inspection. Hyde act instructs the U.S. administration to terminate the deal in the event of a nuclear test by India and also demand the nuclear technology be given back after a prior notice of 1 year.

The 123 Agreement

Some of the articles as mentioned in the 123 agreement:

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
CONCERNING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (123 AGREEMENT)

The Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

RECOGNIZING the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner;

DESIRING to cooperate extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis;

WISHING to develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and with due respect for each other’s nuclear programmes;

DESIRING to establish the necessary legal framework and basis for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

AFFIRMING that cooperation under this Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation;

NOTING the understandings expressed in the India – U.S. Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India covering aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle;

AFFIRMING their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

NOTING their respective commitments to safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to adequate physical protection of nuclear material and effective national export controls;

MINDFUL that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a view to protecting the environment;

MINDFUL of their shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and

DESIROUS of strengthening the strategic partnership between them;

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1 – DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(A) “By-product material” means any radioactive material (except special fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special fissionable material. By-product material shall not be subject to safeguards or any other form of verification under this Agreement, unless it has been decided otherwise by prior mutual agreement in writing between the two Parties.

(B) “Component” means a component part of equipment, or other item so designated by agreement of the Parties.

(C) “Conversion” means any of the normal operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, preceding fuel fabrication and excluding enrichment, by which uranium is transformed from one chemical form to another – for example, from uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to uranium dioxide (UO2) or from uranium oxide to metal.

(D) “Decommissioning” means the actions taken at the end of a facility’s useful life to retire the facility from service in the manner that provides adequate protection for the health and safety of the decommissioning workers and the general public, and for the environment. These actions can range from closing down the facility and a minimal removal of nuclear material coupled with continuing maintenance and surveillance, to a complete removal of residual radioactivity in excess of levels acceptable for unrestricted use of the facility and its site.

(E) “Dual-Use Item” means a nuclear related item which has a technical use in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

(F) “Equipment” means any equipment in nuclear operation including reactor, reactor pressure vessel, reactor fuel charging and discharging equipment, reactor control rods, reactor pressure tubes, reactor primary coolant pumps, zirconium tubing, equipment for fuel fabrication and any other item so designated by the Parties.

(G) “High enriched uranium” means uranium enriched to twenty percent or greater in the isotope 235.

(H) “Information” means any information that is not in the public domain and is transferred in any form pursuant to this Agreement and so designated and documented in hard copy or digital form by mutual agreement by the Parties that it shall be subject to this Agreement, but will cease to be information whenever the Party transferring the information or any third party legitimately releases it into the public domain.

(I) “Low enriched uranium” means uranium enriched to less than twenty percent in the isotope 235.

(J) “Major critical component” means any part or group of parts essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility or heavy water production facility.

(K) “Non-nuclear material” means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

(L) “Nuclear material” means (1) source material and (2) special fissionable material. “Source material” means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time determine; and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. “Special fissionable material” means plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, any substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other substances as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. “Special fissionable material” does not include “source material”. Any determination by the Board of Governors of the IAEA under Article XX of that Agency’s Statute or otherwise that amends the list of materials considered to be “source material” or “special fissionable material” shall only have effect under this Agreement when both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in writing that they accept such amendment.

(M) “Peaceful purposes” include the use of information, nuclear material, equipment or components in such fields as research, power generation, medicine, agriculture and industry, but do not include use in, research on, or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other military purpose. Provision of power for a military base drawn from any power network, production of radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in military environment for diagnostics, therapy and sterility assurance, and other similar purposes as may be mutually agreed by the Parties shall not be regarded as military purpose.

(N) “Person” means any individual or any entity subject to the territorial jurisdiction of either Party but does not include the Parties.

(O) “Reactor” means any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium or any combination thereof.

(P) “Sensitive nuclear facility” means any facility designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium.

(Q) “Sensitive nuclear technology” means any information that is not in the public domain and that is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of any sensitive nuclear facility, or other such information that may be so designated by agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE 2 – SCOPE OF COOPERATION

1. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

2. The purpose of the Agreement being to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the Parties, the Parties may pursue cooperation in all relevant areas to include, but not limited to, the following:

a. Advanced nuclear energy research and development in such areas as may be agreed between the Parties;
b. Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, as set out in Article 3;
c. Facilitation of exchange of scientists for visits, meetings, symposia and collaborative research;
d. Full civil nuclear cooperation activities covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycleincluding technology transfer on an industrial or commercial scale between the Parties or authorized persons;
e. Development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors;
f. Advanced research and development in nuclear sciences including but not limited to biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry, environment and climate change;
g. Supply between the Parties, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries, of nuclear material;
h. Alteration in form or content of nuclear material as provided for in Article 6;
i. Supply between the Parties of equipment, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries;
j. Controlled thermonuclear fusion including in multilateral projects; and
k. Other areas of mutual interest as may be agreed by the Parties.

3. Transfer of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information under this Agreement may be undertaken directly between the Parties or through authorized persons. Such transfers shall be subject to this Agreement and to such additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the Parties. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information transferred from the territory of one Party to the territory of the other Party, whether directly or through a third country, will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to this Agreement only upon confirmation, by the appropriate authority of the recipient Party to the appropriate authority of the supplier Party that such items both will be subject to the Agreement and have been received by the recipient Party.

4. The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.

ARTICLE 3 – TRANSFER OF INFORMATION

1. Information concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be transferred between the Parties. Transfers of information may be accomplished through reports, data banks and computer programs and any other means mutually agreed to by the Parties. Fields that may be covered include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

a. Research, development, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use of reactors, reactor experiments, and decommissioning;
b. The use of nuclear material in physical, chemical, radiological and biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry;
c. Fuel cycle activities to meet future world-wide civil nuclear energy needs, including multilateral approaches to which they are parties for ensuring nuclear fuel supply and appropriate techniques for management of nuclear wastes;
d. Advanced research and development in nuclear science and technology;
e. Health, safety, and environmental considerations related to the foregoing;
f. Assessments of the role nuclear power may play in national energy plans;
g. Codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear industry;
h. Research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including bilateral activities and contributions toward multilateral projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); and
i. Any other field mutually agreed to by the Parties.

2. Cooperation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not limited to, training, exchange of personnel, meetings, exchange of samples, materials and instruments for experimental purposes and a balanced participation in joint studies and projects.

3. This Agreement does not require the transfer of any information regarding matters outside the scope of this Agreement, or information that the Parties are not permitted under their respective treaties, national laws, or regulations to transfer.

4. Restricted Data, as defined by each Party, shall not be transferred under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4 – NUCLEAR TRADE

1. The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves in the mutual interests of their respective industry, utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade between third countries and either Party of items obligated to the other Party. The Parties recognize that reliability of supplies is essential to ensure smooth and uninterrupted operation of nuclear facilities and that industry in both the Parties needs continuing reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation of nuclear installations.

2. Authorizations, including export and import licenses as well as authorizations or consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear material movement should be consistent with the sound and efficient administration of this Agreement and should not be used to restrict trade. It is further agreed that if the relevant authority of the concerned Party considers that an application cannot be processed within a twomonth period it shall immediately, upon request, provide reasoned information to the submitting Party. In the event of a refusal to authorize an application or a delay exceeding four months from the date of the first application the Party of the submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent consultations under Article 13 of this Agreement, which shall take place at the earliest opportunity and in any case not later than 30 days after such a request.

ARTICLE 5 – TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components may be transferred for applications consistent with this Agreement. Any special fissionable material transferred under this Agreement shall be low enriched uranium, except as provided in paragraph 5.

2. Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies.

3. Natural or low enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in reactor experiments and in reactors, for conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed to by the Parties.

4. The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in reactor experiments or the loading of reactors, the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime, use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and the accomplishment of other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties.

5. Small quantities of special fissionable material may be transferred for use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and for such other purposes as the Parties may agree.

6.

(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.

(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:

i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.

ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.

iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors.

iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.

(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.

ARTICLE 6 – NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES

In keeping with their commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation, both Parties, as they do with other states with advanced nuclear technology, may carry out the following nuclear fuel cycle activities:

i) Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment up to twenty percent in the isotope 235 of uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement, as well as of uranium used in or produced through the use of equipment so transferred, may be carried out.

ii) Irradiation within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party of plutonium, uranium-233, high enriched uranium and irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

iii) With a view to implementing full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned in the Joint Statement of the Parties of July 18, 2005, the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year. The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities. These arrangements and procedures shall include provisions with respect to physical protection standards set out in Article 8, storage standards set out in Article 7, and environmental protections set forth in Article 11 of this Agreement, and such other provisions as may be agreed by the Parties. Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.

iv) Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

ARTICLE 7 – STORAGE AND RETRANSFERS

1. Plutonium and uranium 233 (except as either may be contained in irradiated fuel elements), and high enriched uranium, transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred, may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of physical protection that are set out in IAEA document INFCIRC 225/REV 4 as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties. Each Party shall record such facilities on a list, made available to the other Party. A Party’s list shall be held confidential if that Party so requests. Either Party may make changes to its list by notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification has been received. If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this sub-Article are not being fully complied with, immediate consultations may be called for. Following upon such consultations, each Party shall ensure by means of such consultations that necessary remedial measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels of physical protection referred to above at the facility in question. However, if the Party on whose territory the nuclear material in question is stored determines that such measures are not feasible, it will shift the nuclear material to another appropriate, listed facility it identifies.

2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, and information transferred pursuant to this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred shall not be transferred or re-transferred to unauthorized persons or, unless the Parties agree, beyond the recipient Party’s territorial jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 8 – PHYSICAL PROTECTION

1. Adequate physical protection shall be maintained with respect to nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred.

2. To fulfill the requirement in paragraph 1, each Party shall apply measures in accordance with

(i) levels of physical protection at least equivalent to the recommendations published in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 entitled “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,” and in any subsequent revisions of that document agreed to by the Parties, and (ii) the provisions of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and any amendments to the Convention that enter into force for both Parties.

3. The Parties will keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of those agencies or authorities having responsibility for ensuring that levels of physical protection for nuclear material in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control are adequately met and having responsibility for coordinating response and recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this Article. The Parties will also keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of the designated points of contact within their national authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transportation and other matters of mutual concern.

4. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid undue interference in the Parties’ peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.

ARTICLE 9 – PEACEFUL USE

Nuclear material, equipment and components transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product materialused in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, equipment, and components so transferred shall not be used by the recipient Party for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.

ARTICLE 10 – IAEA SAFEGUARDS

1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating Party.

2. Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA [identifying data] and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

3. Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, or components so transferred shall be subject to the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the United States of America, done at Vienna November 18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980, and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

4. If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.

5. Each Party shall take such measures as are necessary to maintain and facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards in its respective territory provided for under this Article.

6. Each Party shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, equipment, or components so transferred. The procedures applicable to India shall be those set forth in the India-specific Safeguards Agreement referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article.

7. Upon the request of either Party, the other Party shall report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party on the status of all inventories of material subject to this Agreement.

8. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in the Parties’ peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.

ARTICLE 11 – ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The Parties shall cooperate in following the best practices for minimizing the impact on the environment from any radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities under this Agreement and in related matters of health and safety.

ARTICLE 12 – IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

1. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:

a) to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either Party;
b) to avoid interference in such activities;
c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe conduct of such activities; and
d) to take full account of the long term requirements of the nuclear energy programs of the Parties.

2. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used to:

a) secure unfair commercial or industrial advantages or to restrict trade to the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of either Party or hamper their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic;
b) interfere with the nuclear policy or programs for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including research and development; or
c) impede the free movement of nuclear material, non nuclear material and equipment supplied under this Agreement within the territory of the Parties.

3. When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United States organizations requires exchanges of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices.

ARTICLE 13 – CONSULTATIONS

The Parties undertake to consult at the request of either Party regarding the implementation of this Agreement and the development of further cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. The Parties recognize that such

consultations are between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.

2. Each Party shall endeavor to avoid taking any action that adversely affects cooperation envisaged under Article 2 of this Agreement. If either Party at any time following the entry into force of this Agreement does not comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties shall promptly hold consultations with a view to resolving the matter in a way that protects the legitimate interests of both Parties, it being understood that rights of either Party under Article 16.2 remain unaffected.

3. Consultations under this Article may be carried out by a Joint Committee specifically established for this purpose. A Joint Technical Working Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set up to ensure the fulfillment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangements referred to in Article 17.

ARTICLE 14 – TERMINATION AND CESSATION OF COOPERATION

1. Either Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year’s written notice to the other Party. A Party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination. The Agreement shall terminate one year from the date of the written notice, unless the notice has been withdrawn by the providing Party in writing prior to the date of termination.

2. Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the reasons cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations. The Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.

3. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, the Parties shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertently or otherwise and whether the violation could be considered as material. No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance.

4. Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement, either Party shall have the right to require the return by the other Party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. A notice by a Party that is invoking the right of return shall be delivered to the other Party on or before the date of termination of this Agreement. The notice shall contain a statement of the items subject to this Agreement as to which the Party is requesting return. Except as provided in provisions of Article 16.3, all other legal obligations pertaining to this Agreement shall cease to apply with respect to the nuclear items remaining on the territory of the Party concerned upon termination of this Agreement.

5. The two Parties recognize that exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations. If either Party seeks to exercise its right pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party of any nuclear items mentioned in paragraph 4, undertake consultations with the other Party. Such consultations shall give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the Party concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security. Both Parties shall take into account the potential negative consequences of such termination on the on-going contracts and projects initiated under this Agreement of significance for the respective nuclear programmes of either Party.

6. If either Party exercises its right of return pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items is required, the Parties shall agree on methods and arrangements for the return of the items, the relevant quantity of the items to be returned, and the amount of compensation that would have to be paid by the Party exercising the right to the other Party.

7. Prior to return of nuclear items, the Parties shall satisfy themselves that full safety, radiological and physical protection measures have been ensured in accordance with their existing national regulations and that the transfers pose no unreasonable risk to either Party, countries through which the nuclear items may transit and to the global environment and are in accordance with existing international regulations.

8. The Party seeking the return of nuclear items shall ensure that the timing, methods and arrangements for return of nuclear items are in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Accordingly, the consultations between the Parties shall address mutual commitments as contained in Article 5.6. It is not the purpose of the provisions of this Article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the Parties under Article 5.6.

9. The arrangements and procedures concluded pursuant to Article 6(iii) shall be subject to suspension by either Party in exceptional circumstances, as defined by the Parties, after consultations have been held between the Parties aimed at reaching mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues, while taking into account the effects of such suspension on other aspects of cooperation under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 15 – SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute.

ARTICLE 16 – ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that they have completed all applicable requirements for its entry into force.

2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of40 years. It shall continue in force thereafter for additional periods of 10 years each. Each Party may, by giving 6 months written notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial 40 year period or at the end of any subsequent 10 year period.

3. Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement, Articles 5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 shall continue in effect so long as any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, by-product material, equipment or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the Party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that such nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.

4. This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.

5. The Parties may consult, at the request of either Party, on possible amendments to this Agreement. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree. Any amendment shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal legal procedures necessary for the entry into force have been completed.

ARTICLE 17 – ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT

1. The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an Administrative Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this Agreement.

2. The principles of fungibility and equivalence shall apply to nuclear material and non-nuclear material subject to this Agreement. Detailed provisions for applying these principles shall be set forth in the Administrative Arrangement.

3. The Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended by agreement of the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

AGREED MINUTE

During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (”the Agreement”) signed today, the following understandings, which shall be an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.

Proportionality

For the purposes of implementing the rights specified in Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement with respect to special fissionable material and by-product material produced through the use of nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, transferred pursuant to the Agreement and not used in or produced through the use of equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement, such rights shall in practice be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material and by-product material produced that represents the ratio of transferred nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, used in the production of the special fissionable material and by-product material to the total amount of nuclear material and non-nuclear material so used, and similarly for subsequent generations.

By-product material

The Parties agree that reporting and exchanges of information on by-product material subject to the Agreement will be limited to the following:

(1) Both Parties would comply with the provisions as contained in the IAEA document GOV/1999/19/Rev.2, with regard to by-product material subject to the Agreement.

(2) With regard to tritium subject to the Agreement, the Parties will exchange annually information pertaining to its disposition for peaceful purposes consistent with Article 9 of this Agreement.

India gains, US doesn’t lose

The full text of the 123 Agreement confirms that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has kept the promises he made to Parliament

Yes. Under the 123 Agreement, India has neither given up its right to test nor agreed to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits all nuclear testing. To be sure, the US law demands a suspension of nuclear cooperation in the event of an Indian test.

The text of the 123 agreement (Article 14.2), however, offers immediate bilateral consultations in the event of an Indian test and commits the two sides “to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other states which could impact national security”.

Put another way, India reserves the right to test if other countries do the same.

2. Fuel supply assurances: Does India have credible assurances on uninterrupted fuel supply under all conditions?

Yes. After its bitter experience with the Tarapur nuclear power station, when Washington cut off fuel supplies after the 1974 test, New Delhi has insisted on getting iron-clad guarantees on fuel supplies. It has successfully got them written into the 123 Agreement.

Sections 2.2 (e), 4.1, 5.6, 14.5, and 14.8 deal with various dimensions of fuel supply guarantees. They fully commit the US to help India develop a “strategic reserve” of nuclear fuel for the entire lifetime of the reactors. The US also promises to “create conditions” for India’s “assured and full access” to the international fuel market.

Unlike the non-binding provisions of the Hyde Act, which urges Washington to limit India’s access to fuel supplies from other countries in the event of a termination of the bilateral agreement, the 123 Agreement places no such restrictions.

It also ensures that the US commitment to facilitate fuel supplies is absolute and is not defined by the circumstances of the termination of the bilateral agreement.

Section 5.6 (b) (iv) of the 123 Agreement states: “If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.”

No bilateral agreement in recent memory has so many layers of redundancy written into it. If all fails, an extreme contingency, India will also have the right for “corrective measures” under Article 5.6 (c).

3. Right to reprocess spent fuel: Is India permitted to reprocess the waste material from imported reactors and convert it into fuel for fast breeder reactors?

Yes. Section 6 (iii) of the Agreement concedes New Delhi’s unambiguous right to reprocess spent fuel — a key element of India’s three-stage civilian nuclear programme.

This right will come into effect when India builds a dedicated reprocessing facility that meets the current standard of IAEA safeguards. Once India is ready to reprocess, the two sides will begin consultations on the arrangements for reprocessing within six months and complete them in one year.

This two-step process has been criticized by some as inadequate. This, however, is a significant improvement over the Tarapur agreement which had no time lines for a decision on reprocessing. The central consideration for India has been to get an upfront programmatic consent and define credible procedures for subsequent arrangements.

4. Right of return: How will the two countries deal with the “right to return” of US supplied equipment and material in the event of an Indian nuclear test?

With reasonable pragmatism. The 123 Agreement acknowledges the “right to return” and goes on to lay out the potential problems involved. As Article 14.4 points out, both sides “recognise that exercising the right to return would have profound consequences for their relations”.

It calls for consultations in the event the US seeks to exercise this right and suggests that both sides “shall take into account the potential negative consequences of such termination on the on-going projects and contracts”. And Article 14.5 calls for “prompt compensation” in the event the US exercises the right to return. Some have expressed the concern that the right of return might be attached to the 45 nations NSG’s approval of the Indo-US nuclear accord. These fears are entirely misplaced for Article 14.8 insists that the right of return does not “derogate” from India’s right for assured fuel supplies from the international community under Article 5.6.

5. Fallback safeguards: Would the US inspectors roam around the Indian nuclear facilities, in the event of an unlikely end to the IAEA safeguards arrangements?

No. The 123 Agreement offers no role for any party other than the IAEA in the verification of India’s commitments for peaceful use of imported technology. From the launch of its nuclear programme many decades ago, India always accepted safeguards on imported nuclear equipment and material.

Under the 123 Agreement, India is committed to IAEA safeguards “in perpetuity” in return for “assured fuel supplies”. In the unlikely event of a breakdown of this arrangement with the IAEA, Article 10.4 offers consultations to arrive at “appropriate verification measures”. Apprehensions about a special US role in safeguarding India’s civilian nuclear programme seem entirely misplaced.

6. Full Civil Cooperation: Is India entitled to all nuclear cooperation it needs from the United States?

Yes. Article 2.2 defines the scope of the 123 Agreement as including a range of areas from nuclear research to safety to “full civil nuclear cooperation activities covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle including technology transfer on an industrial or commercial scale”.

Some critics have cited the Hyde Act to say “full” cooperation does not include transfers of uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production technologies. It is indeed the policy of the United States not to export these technologies to any nation, even its closest allies or even other nuclear weapon states.

The practical question for India, however, is, should it demand technologies just because they are not on offer? If India is an exporter of heavy water and has been reprocessing for four decades why would it want to get these technologies from the United States, that too under very intrusive conditions? Why would the Indian government want to demoralise the scientific community by importing these sensitive technologies?

7. The integrity of India’s nuclear programme: Are India’s nuclear weapons programme and the indigenous civilian programme constrained by the US?

No. Even the most paranoid elements in India will find it difficult to argue that our military and civilian nuclear programmes are compromised under the 123 Agreement. Article 2.4 affirms that the agreement “will be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities” involving material and technology, military or civilian, acquired “independent of this agreement”.

8. Foreign policy autonomy: Is there a secret unwritten agenda in the 123 Agreement, as some Left leaders have alleged?

Not by a long shot. It is a long political tradition in India to look for secret clauses in bilateral agreements. Further, unlike the non-binding provisions of the Hyde Act, there is no reference to Iran or other foreign policy issues in the 123 Agreement.

The principal question here is whether civilian nuclear cooperation with the US is subject to either American caprice or unilateral decision. The 123 Agreement makes it quite clear that the determination on “material breach” under the 123 Agreement will not be a unilateral US decision; it will have to be taken by the IAEA Board of Governors (Article 14.3).

The 123 Agreement is likely to go down as one of the finest achievements of Indian diplomacy. India’s gain, however, is not a loss for the United States. It is a triumph for both Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush for accomplishing the impossible task of bridging India’s nuclear interests with the global non-proliferation regime.

The deal in a question answer form

What are the terms of the deal?

The details of the deal include the following:

• India agrees to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog group, access to its civilian nuclear program. But India would decide which of its many nuclear facilities to classify as civilian. By March 2006, India promised to place fourteen of its twenty-two power reactors under IAEA safeguards permanently Military facilities—and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has produced up to now—will be exempt from inspections or safeguards.
• India commits to signing an Additional Protocol (PDF)—which allows more intrusive IAEA inspections—or its civilian facilities.
• India agrees to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.
• India commits to strengthening the security of its nuclear arsenals.
• India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) with the United States banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. India agrees to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that don’t possess them and to support international nonproliferation efforts.
• U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy program.

What kind of technology would India receive in return?

India would be eligible to buy U.S. dual-use nuclear technology, including materials and equipment that could be used to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, potentially creating the material for nuclear bombs. It would also receive imported fuel for its nuclear reactors.

What do proponents say about the deal?

• Recognizes India’s history of imposing voluntary safeguards on its nuclear program. Proponents of the deal say India has an excellent record of setting credible safeguards on its nuclear program for the last thirty years. After the safeguards on the U.S.-supplied Tarapur nuclear facility expired in 1993, for example, India voluntarily established a new agreement with the IAEA to continue the restrictions.
• Recognizes that India has a good record on proliferation. Although it is not a signatory to the NPT, India has maintained strict controls on its nuclear technology and has not shared it with any other country. Proponents of the deal say this restraint shows that India, unlike its nuclear neighbor Pakistan, is committed to responsible nuclear stewardship and fighting proliferation. In May 2005 India passed a law, the WMD Act, which criminalizes the trade and brokering of sensitive technology.
• Rewards India’s decision to adopt similar nuclear export standards as those imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India has thus far chosen to abide by the strict export controls on nuclear technology set by the NSG, a group of forty-five nuclear-supplier states that voluntarily coordinates controls of nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. Experts say if India chose to lift these voluntary restrictions, it could easily sell its technology to far less trustworthy countries around the world. The U.S. deal would reward the Indian government for its voluntary controls and give New Delhi incentive to continue them, against the demands of Indian hardliners who question what India gets out of placing such limits on itself.

• The safeguards apply only to facilities and material manufactured by India beginning when the agreement was reached. It doesn’t cover the fissile material produced by India over the last several decades of nuclear activity.
• The deal does not require India to cap or limit its fissile material production. This comes at a time when nearly all the major nuclear powers—including the United States, France, Britain, and Russia—are moving to limit their production.
• It does not require India to restrict the number of nuclear weapons it plans to produce.
• There are far more cost-efficient ways to improve India’s energy and technology sectors. These could include making India’s existing electricity grid more efficient, restructuring the country’s coal industry, and expanding the use of renewable energy sources. All these steps would involve much less dangerous transfers of technology that would not be dual-use, and therefore not convertible to nuclear weapons production.

Who needs to approve the agreement?

The final terms of the nuclear deal need approval from several sources before they can be implemented. The bodies required to approve the deal include:

• IAEA. India has to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA under which all nuclear material and equipment transferred to it by the United States as a part of this deal shall be subject to safeguards. The Board of Governors of the IAEA has to approve this India-specific safeguards agreement. In Febuary 2008, Indian negotiators and IAEA officials met in Vienna discuss their differences and complete the agreement.
• India’s Parliament. The deal is controversial in India, with many parliamentarians arguing it will limit India’s sovereignty and hurt its security. Some Indian nuclear experts are protesting what they see as excessive U.S. participation in deciding which of India’s nuclear facilities to define as civilian, and open to international inspections under the plan.
• The Nuclear Suppliers Group. The NSG tries to restrict the spread of nuclear technology that could be used in weapons programs through export controls. The United States will try to convince the group to make an exception for India, which may be a difficult case to make when the United States is simultaneously trying to prevent Iran and North Korea from gaining similar access to nuclear fuel and technology.
• Congress. Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which regulates the trade of nuclear material, congressional approval is needed to pass the exemptions to U.S. laws required for the nuclear deal to be implemented.

What effect will the U.S.-India deal have on the NPT?

It could gut the agreement, experts say. Article 1 of the treaty says nations that possess nuclear weapons agree not to help states that do not possess weapons to acquire them. In addition, it could lead other suppliers—including Russia and China—to bend the international rules so they can sell their own nuclear technology to other countries, some of them hostile to the United States. On the other hand, the NPT was already failing in its mission to prevent proliferation. Many countries—including North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq—have cheated while being signatories of the NPT.

What role does China play in the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal?

It is a motivating factor in the deal, some experts say. China’s rise in the region is prompting the United States to seek a strategic relationship with India. “The United States is trying to cement its relationship with the world’s largest democracy in order to counterbalance China,”. The Bush administration is “hoping that latching onto India as the rising star of Asia could help them handle China,” .
The growing economic relationship between China and India is so critical to New Delhi that its interests in China cannot be threatened or replaced by any agreement with the United States. Indians “have no interest whatsoever in trying to contain China because they believe this could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, and their whole policy is to seek the best possible relationship with China,”. U.S. nuclear aid to India could foster a dangerous nuclear rivalry between India and China. Though India has a strong interest in building economic relations with China, New Delhi is still wary of China’s military rise in the region.

What effect will the deal have on U.S. and Indian relations with Pakistan?

Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf, who has suffered fierce criticism at home—and survived two assassination attempts—or his strong alliance with the United States since 9/11, has not received a similar deal on nuclear energy from Washington. Some experts say this apparent U.S. favoritism toward India could increase the nuclear rivalry between the intensely competitive nations, and potentially raise tensions in the already dangerous region. The two countries, both admittedly now nuclear, could be forced to deal more cautiously with each other. Pakistan is already a proliferation risk: Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s illicit nuclear network, revealed in 2004, shocked the world with its brazen trade of nuclear technology.

Hiding behind Hyde

The advantages of the Indo-US nuclear agreement are too great to be thrown away because of an impressionist reading of the Hyde Act

The Hyde Act, 2006 has prominently featured in the controversy over the Indo-US nuclear agreement. On the one hand the Hyde Act has been criticized because it denies full cooperation in civil nuclear energy to India. It requires India to participate in a nuclear policy congruent to that of the US, for instance, on Iran; it authorizes termination of nuclear cooperation if India conducts future nuclear weapons tests. But the government’s view is that the Hyde Act is not binding on India and will not materially control the Indo-US Agreement. It is, therefore, relevant to note of the legal implications of the Hyde Act.

The Indo-US Agreement is executed under the provisions of Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954. This section requires an Agreement for Cooperation (known as a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement or a Section 123 agreement) should be concluded with a particular country before the US can assist that country in the nuclear field according to nine criteria. The president can exempt a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement from any of the criteria but such an exemption requires Congressional approval. That’s why the Congress passed Hyde Act.

Apart from treaties, the president of the US has the power to enter into executive agreements, which do not require the assent of the Senate and are not subject to the formal treaty-making process in the US Constitution. Executive agreements are of two kinds. One, those that are made subject to Congressional authorization or approval. Other executive agreements are made solely in accordance with the president’s constitutional power and are known as sole executive agreements. They do not require Congressional approval or authority.

The Indo-US Agreement is a Congressional-Executive Agreement under the authority of the Hyde Act passed by Congress, and to which the president gave his assent on December 18 2006. The Hyde Act must therefore be considered in some respects at least as delimiting the president’s authority to implement the nuclear agreement with India.

The Hyde Act is described as an act to exempt the proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India from certain requirements of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954. The act requires the US Government to follow certain policies in the implementation of the agreement, the president to report to Congress periodically on the implementation of the cooperation and places restrictions on transfers of nuclear material. It also makes provisions for the termination of nuclear transfers to India and accountability for nuclear material supplied to India.

Simultaneous with the signing of the Hyde Act into law on December 18, 2006 by President Bush, he issued an important statement, aimed at allaying certain apprehensions of India arising from the act. President Bush stated that its prescriptive provisions would be treated only as being of an advisory character. The president’s statement said: “Section 103 of the Act purports to establish US policy with respect to various international affairs matters. My approval of the Act does not constitute my adoption of the statements of policy as US foreign policy. Given the Constitution’s commitment to the presidency of the authority to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs, the executive branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory. Also, if Section 104(d)(2) of the Act were construed to prohibit the executive branch from transferring or approving the transfer of an item to India contrary to Nuclear Suppliers Group transfer guidelines that may be in effect at that time of such future transfer, a serious question would exist as to whether the provision is unconstitutional by delegated legislative power to an international body. In order to avoid this constitutional question, the executive branch shall construe Section 104(d)(2) as advisory. The executive branch will give Sections 103 and 104(d)(2) the due weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should require, to the extent consistent with US foreign policy.”

Section 103(4) of the Hyde Act that the president refers to, requires the US to secure India’s full and active participation in US efforts to dissuade, isolate and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and capability to enrich uranium and so on. Section 104 (d) (2) which the president refers to states that notwithstanding the 123 agreement, no item subject to such agreement may be transferred to India if such transfer is inconsistent with transfer guidelines for the NSG operating on the date of transfer.

President Bush’s perception of the controlling effect of the Hyde Act on his executive powers may not necessarily be shared by succeeding presidents. Nevertheless, the statement does qualify the rigors of the Hyde Act as a matter of law.

The advantages of the Indo-US nuclear agreement are too great to be thrown away because of an impressionist reading of the Hyde Act. The problem requires a deeper understanding of the position of the president in relation to Congress in the system of separation of powers and checks and balances in the US Constitution, and the complexities of nuclear technology. Any evaluation of the Hyde Act must also take into account the inevitable gulf between legislative prescriptions of the Hyde Act and their expedient and practical implementation over the 40 years duration of the agreement.

The setting up of an expert committee by the government to examine the implications of the Hyde Act is a way forward in a complex problem.

It’s about options, not co-option

Whether the India-US civilian nuclear deal goes through or not, it is now simply a matter of politics. But what is difficult to understand is why nay-sayers want to foreclose India’s nuclear options, even before the door opens. The most important aspect of the deal is that it widens the choices on offer for India — for environment-friendly and sustainable sources of energy, for access to technologies that have been long denied, and for a chance to arrive at the international high table of the UN Security Council.

There is no specific compulsion, but there is an additional, much-required choice if the government of the day wishes to exercise it. Not to mention that a plethora of companies and entities that have long been blocked out from international high technology commerce, will also get the option.

There is nothing in the much discussed 123 Agreement that says that India has to enhance its energy basket by setting up atomic power reactors. It certainly does not say that India has to get its nuclear reactors or fuel or whatever only from the US. But what it does do, most importantly, is to open up another set of options to access power and technology required for India to sustain its economic growth story.

For the past few decades, Indian scientists have managed to bypass the technology-denial regime and achieve very impressive results and growth. However, given the rapidly changing environment and the fast pace of globalization, much more is needed just to sustain current levels. This deal provides India not only a hugely enhanced global stature, but also the choice to access and shop around for its specific needs from those that have the goods, if we want to. Today, we do not have that option. We have to make do without it.

A key argument against nuclear power is the enormous expense involved in setting up reactors to produce electric energy, a view the Left has been at pains to point out. However, with depleting reserves of good quality coal, the international price of fossil fuels like crude oil crossing $ 100 a barrel and gas pipelines fraught with security threats, even the cost effectiveness of other options is open to debate. The capital cost of converting renewable sources of energy, like solar, hydro and wind power is equally prohibitive. But India needs energy to continue powering its growth.

Nuclear power at the moment accounts for about 16 per cent of the global electricity supply. France, which uses nuclear energy to power almost 80 per cent of its domestic electricity requirements, finds the usage competitive and cost-effective. According to the World Nuclear Transport Institute, the environmental fallout of a tonne of nuclear fuel is equivalent to burning about 120,000 tonnes of coal. Also uranium, unlike fossil fuels, can be recycled.

A study conducted some years ago by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) estimates that the cost of nuclear electricity generation in India remains competitive with thermal power for plants located about 1,200 kms away from coal pit head, when full credit is given to long-term operating cost, especially in respect of fuel prices. Prices and cost-effectiveness, however, are again not the most critical issue about the 123 Agreement. Saving the environment, while critical for our existence and survival of this planet, is also not the issue. Neither is the vitally important matter of energy security. The issue is that the country must have as wide a variety of choices as possible.

Critics from the Left have slammed the UPA government’s foreign policy, claiming that with the deal, the government has lost its non-aligned moorings, sold out and become allies of the ‘ugly’ superpower, the United States of America. Have critics of the deal, from the Left and the Right, who steadfastly and virulently refuse to allow the government to bring the civilian nuclear deal to fruition, stopped to consider that the more choices a country has, the more non-aligned it is? Or have Messrs Karat, Bardhan and Advani decided that non-alignment as a concept is dead and India should remain aligned to an idealistic, completely fossilised terminology that signifies nothing, while ignoring its own critical needs?

Today, to legitimately access nuclear fuel for its atomic power reactors to function, India has to scout the world for supplies of enriched uranium. Russia and even China have bailed us out when lack of fuel supplies threatened closure of power plants. Why should a proud sovereign country have to go begging to find loopholes just to meet its legitimate requirements? Why, when after decades of nuclear isolation, India is getting a chance to return to the international mainstream, is the opportunity not being seized upon? Why can we not act as mature citizens of a country whose time has come?

But isn’t it pointless to be idealistic to the point that the country ignores its specific needs to wait interminably for an international order to become more equitable and egalitarian? At the least we should have the option.